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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellate jurisdiction over this case is rested in the 
Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to §78-2a-3(2) (e) , Utah Code 
Annotated. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
ISSUE I. IS YOUNG'S "EVIDENCE" OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE 
OF COUNSEL ADMISSIBLE BEFORE THIS COURT? 
Because the trial court did not hold an evidentiary 
hearing in this case, and Young did not file a motion for a 
remand pursuant to Rule 23B, Utah R. App. P., the issues of 
this case should be decided on the trial record. However, 
Young bases much of her brief on post-trial evidence which she 
submitted by way of affidavits supporting a motion for a new 
trial. Because of the nature of this evidence, its use on 
appeal should be considered under the appropriate rule of 
evidence regarding the admissibility of hearsay, Rule 802, 
Utah Rules of Evidence. The evidence should also be subject 
to the law prohibiting the submission of new evidence on 
appeal. State v. Bredehoft, 966P.2d 285 (Utah App. 1998). 
ISSUE II. DID THE DEFENDANT RECEIVE COMPETENT LEGAL 
REPRESENTATION AT TRIAL? 
Utah has adopted the two prong Strickland test for 
analyzing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. State 
1 
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v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1332 (Utah App. 1995); Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). Under the 
Strickland test, the appellant must first demonstrate that her 
legal counsel's representation fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness. The appellant must then show 
that, but for her counsel's unprofessional errors there is a 
reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would 
have been different. To prevail, the appellant must meet both 
prongs of the Strickland test. Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 
870 (Utah 1993). 
The appropriate standard of review of trial counsel's 
choices regarding trial strategy is deference, even if the 
choices are incorrect in hindsight. State v. Tennyson, 850 P. 
2d 461 (Utah App. 1993). The appropriate standard of review 
of a trial court's ruling on a motion for a new trial based 
upon a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is deference 
to the trial courts findings of fact, but review of its legal 
conclusions for correctness. Perry, at page 1238 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCE, AND RULES 
Amendment VI, United States Constitution. 
2 
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In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of 
the State and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause 
of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor, and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defense. 
Rule 802., Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Hearsay Rule. Hearsay is not admissible except as 
provided by law or by these rules. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves a prosecution and conviction for a 
violation of Section 41-la-201, U.C.A., Registration Required 
and Section 76-5-102.4, U.C.A., Assault Against a Peace 
Officer. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
On or about February 13, 1998, Cindy Lou Young ("Young") 
was arrested and booked into jail for Assault Against a Peace 
Officer, Expired Vehicle Registration, and Violation of a 
Protective Order, Section 76-5-108 U.C.A. (Record, page 1.). 
3 
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An information charging those three misdemeanor crimes was 
filed with the court on March 27, 1998. (Record, page 9.) On 
October 18, 1998, an Amended Information was filed which 
dropped the charge of Violation of a Protective Order. 
(Record, page 42.) On October 18, 1998, a jury trial was held 
before the Honorable Anthony B. Quinn of the Third District 
Court. Young was represented at trial by David R. Maddox. 
DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT 
At trial, the jury convicted Young of Assault Against a 
Peace Officer and Expired Vehicle Registration. (Record, page 
46.) Young was sentenced to pay a fine of $500 and was 
sentenced to a jail term of 45 days, which was suspended. She 
was also put on probation to the court for a period of 12 
months and required to attend anger management classes. 
(Record, page 73.) 
On January 19, 1999, Young's new counsel, Delano S. 
Findlay, filed a Motion for a New Trial. (Record, page 108.) 
The basis for this motion was ineffective assistance of 
counsel. On March 2, 1999, a hearing on the motion was held 
before Judge Paul Maughan. The hearing before Judge Maughan 
consisted of the arguments of counsel and was not an 
evidentiary hearing. (Hearing Transcript, pages 5-6.) Judge 
4 
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Maughan issued his Conclusions of Law and Order on June 21, 
1999, which denied Young's Motion for a New Trial. (Record, 
page 146.) 
Notice of Appeal in this case was filed on July 1, 1999. 
(Record, page 167.) 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The City accepts the Statement of Facts set forth in 
Young's brief with the following exception. 
The "facts'" set forth in paragraphs 8, 13, 14, and 18 are 
not facts based upon the record of this case. Each of these 
"facts" presented by Young is based solely or partially on 
affidavits presented to Judge Maughan in support of Young's 
Motion for a New Trial. Such affidavits are inappropriate for 
use in this appellate proceeding. State v. Bredehoft, 966 P. 2d 
285 (Utah App. 1998). In addition, while all of the 
affidavits contain hearsay, the Affidavit of Counsel (Record, 
pages 110-112.), is virtually entirely hearsay. It relates 
the purported testimony of a potential witness, as told to 
Young's appellate counsel. Such hearsay statements are 
inadmissable under Rule 802, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
5 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
I. MUCH OF YOUNG'S EVIDENCE OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE 
OF COUNSEL IS NOT ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE BEFORE THE 
'COURT OF APPEALS. 
Much of the evidence upon which Young bases her appeal is 
contained in three affidavits and their attachments. The 
affidavits are of the Appellant Young (Record, pages 79-107.), 
her counsel on appeal Delano S. Findlay (Record, pages 110-
114.), and a trial witness Bobbi Johnson (Record, pages 115-
117.). The evidence contained in these affidavits were not 
taken as evidence before the trial court, contain hearsay, and 
contain evidence that would be considered to be new evidence 
on appeal. These affidavits should be disregarded by the 
Court of Appeals and the issue of ineffective assistance of 
counsel should be treated as if raised for the first time on 
appeal. 
II. YOUNG RECEIVED THE BENEFIT OF A VIGOROUS AND 
COMPETENT DEFENSE WHICH RESULTED IN A JUST AND FAIR 
TRIAL. 
Young's argument of ineffective assistance of counsel 
must be measured against the two prong test set forth in 
i 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 
(1984). That test requires that Young demonstrate that her 
trial counsel's representation fell below an objective < 
6 
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standard of reasonableness and that, but for her counsel's 
unprofessional errors, there is a reasonable probability that 
the outcome of the trial would have been different. Fernandez 
v. Cook, 870 P. 2d 870 (Utah 1993). Young cannot satisfy 
either prong of the Strickland test. 
First, the perceived errors that she asserts are all 
legitimate trial strategy decisions made by her trial counsel. 
Such decisions are given great deference by appellate courts. 
State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461 (Utah App. 1993) ("If a 
rational basis for counsel's performance can be articulated, 
we will assume counsel acted competently."). Second, Young has 
not shown that the outcome of the trial would have likely been 
different had her trial counsel presented the "additional 
evidence" she believes he should have presented.' To the 
contrary, almost all of her "additional evidence" relates to 
her arrest and to the aftermath of being sprayed with pepper 
spray. This is unrelated to the core of the City's case, 
since the assault on Officer Lozano consisted of Young's 
kicking and fingernail digging which occurred prior to the use 
of pepper spray or the arrest. 
7 
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DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENTS 
I. MUCH OF YOUNG'S EVIDENCE OF INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IS NOT ADMISSIBLE 
EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS. 
Virtually all of the evidence upon which Young rests her 
argument of ineffective assistance of counsel are based upon 
evidence which she submitted to the trial court with her 
Motion for a New Trial. This evidence was submitted by 
affidavits from the Appellant Young (Record, pages79-107 . ) , 
her counsel on appeal Delano S. Findlay (Record, pages 110-
114.), and a trial witness Bobbi Johnson (Record, pages 115-
117.). These affidavits contained information that was not: 
taken as evidence before the trial court (Hearing Transcript, 
Pages 5-6.), contain hearsay, and contain evidence that would 
be considered to be new evidence on appeal. These affidavits 
should not form the basis for a decision of this Court and the 
issue of ineffective assistance of counsel should be treated 
as if raised for the first time on appeal. 
The status of this case before the Court Of Appeals is 
somewhat unique. Usually ineffective assistance of counsel 
arguments are either made following a Rule 23B, Utah R. App. 
P., Motion to Remand for an evidentiary hearing before the 
trial court; following an evidentiary hearing on a post trial 
8 
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motion; following an evidentiary hearing on a habeas corpus 
petition; or they are sometimes heard for the first time on 
appeal when the record below is considered to be adequate. 
This case does not fall neatly into any of these categories. 
In this case, there was a motion for a new trial heard by 
the trial court below. However, the trial court did not 
conduct an evidentiary hearing on the motion. Therefore, 
Young's trial counsel was not questioned regarding either his 
strategic decisions, or his investigations and preparations 
for trial. The result is the bare trial record accompanied by 
affidavits and proffers of evidence made before the court at 
the motion hearing. 
These affidavits and proffers are not appropriately 
considered to be evidence in the appellate process. In State 
v. Bredehoft, 966 P.2d 285 (Utah App. 1998), the Court of 
Appeals did not allow the appellant to rely on unsubstantiated 
allegations contained in affidavits submitted to support a 
Rule 23B motion. That is very analogous to the situation in 
this case. The affidavits referred to by Young in her brief 
were submitted in support of a Motion for a New Trial, based 
upon an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. This is 
virtually identical to the Bredehoft case and for the same 
9 
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reasons articulated in that case the affidavits should not be 
considered in this case. Bredehoft, at page 290. 
A second reason for disregarding the information in the 
Affidavit of Counsel (Record, pages 110-114.),is the fact that 
it is replete with inadmissable hearsay. For example, in 
paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 of his affidavit, counsel 
describes EMT Glezos' recollection of the incident as told to 
him by Glezos over the telephone. This information is hearsay 
and is not admissible as evidence in either this Court or the 
trial court pursuant to Rule 802, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Finally, much of the information relied upon by Young is 
vxnew" evidence before this Court. The information contained 
in the affidavits was not part of the testimony at trial and 
was not produced at an evidentiary hearing before 'the trial 
court. It is well established that appellate courts of this 
state will not consider new evidence on appeal. Bredehoft, at 
P.290. 
The information contained in the affidavits should be 
disregarded for purposes of this appeal and the Court should 
treat the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel as if 
raised for the first time on appeal. 
10 
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II. YOUNG RECEIVED THE BENEFIT OF A VIGOROUS AND 
COMPETENT DEFENSE WHICH RESULTED IN A JUST AND FAIR 
TRIAL. 
Young argues that she received inadequate assistance of 
counsel at trial. This argument is based on the underlying 
concept that her counsel's performance was so deficient that 
she was deprived of counsel for her defense as guaranteed by 
the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. A 
close review of the facts below revealed that her argument is 
without merit. 
Utah has adopted the analytical framework set forth by 
the United States Supreme Court for deciding ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims under the Sixth Amendment. State 
v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232 (Utah App. 1995). This framework is 
set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. 
Ct. 2052(1984). In Strickland, The United States Supreme 
Court set forth a two prong test for analyzing ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims. To satisfy the first part of 
the Strickland test, a defendant must show that the trial 
counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 688. The second 
prong of the test is satisfied if the defendant can show that 
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
11 
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unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 694; State v. 
Baker, 963 P.2d 801 (Utah App. 1998). If either prong of the 
Strickland test is not established, defendant's claim will 
fail. Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 687; State v. Tennyson, 850 
p.2d 461(Utah App.1993). 
As is set forth below, Young has failed both prongs of 
the test. The analysis, which assumes rhat Young's affidavits 
and proffers are admissible evidence, is set forth below. 
A. THE ACTIONS OF YOUNG'S TRIAL COUNSEL 
INVOLVED TRIAL STRATEGY DECISIONS THAT ARE 
OBJECTIVELY REASONABLE. 
Utah law creates a strong presumption of competence by 
defense counsel. In reviewing defense counsel's actions, the 
court does not need to come to a conclusion that counsel had 
a specific strategy in mind it simply needs to be able to 
articulate some plausible strategic explanation for defense 
counsel's actions. Tennyson, at P.468. 
The presumption of competence is so strong that the Utah 
Court of Appeals has stated: "If a rational basis for 
counsel's performance can be articulated, we will assume 
counsel acted competently. Indeed, authority from this court 
supports the notion that an ineffective assistance claim 
12 
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succeeds only when no conceivable legitimate tactic or 
strategy can be surmised from counsel's actions." Tennyson, 
at P.468. It is also clear from the case law that "Although 
defense counsel must vigorously represent his or her client, 
^counsel [is] not required to develop every conceivable 
defense that [is] available.'" State v. Baker, 963 P.2d 801 
(Utah App. 1998) (citation omitted) . 
Young's first allegation of inadequate representation is 
that her trial counsel failed to interview and call certain 
witnesses that she believed would corroborate her testimony. 
These witnesses were Anthony Glezos, an EMT with the West 
Valley City Fire Department, the tow truck driver who had 
impounded her van, and her neighbor Bobbi Johnson. In each 
case, there is a plausible strategic explanation for trial 
counsel's actions. 
First, with respect to EMT Glezos, all information before 
the court with respect to Glezos consists of hearsay contained 
in an affidavit submitted by Young's appellate counsel. 
(Record, pages 110-114.) Assuming this hearsay to be 
accurate, it appears that Glezos was subpoenaed to appear 
(Record, pages 40-41.) and did speak with trial counsel. 
Following Glezos discussion with trial counsel, trial counsel 
13 
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made the conscious decision to not call Glezos as a witness. 
Because of a lack of the factual evidence in the record, the 
reason for Glezos being excused cannot be conclusively 
determined. However, there are several plausible strategic 
reasons why this occurred. It appears from both the proffer 
of evidence contained in the affidavit (Record, pages 110-
114.) and from Officer Lozano's testimony at trial (Trial 
Transcript, page 96.), that Glezos may have testified that he 
observed the injuries to Officer Lozano's fingers, that he 
gave advice on how to treat the injuries, and that he provided 
Lozano with a bandage (Hearing Transcript, page 12.). Given 
the fact that Young testified that she did not inflict any 
injuries to Lozano's hand, this portion of Glezos testimony 
had the potential to support the prosecution's case. 
Therefore a decision not to call Glezos as a witness is 
legitimately within the realm of trial strategy. 
With respect to the tow truck driver, the record is 
devoid of any evidence concerning trial counsel's 
investigation or decisions involving the tow truck driver. 
Young states in her brief that trial counsel did not interview 
the tow truck driver prior to the beginning of the trial. 
("Appellant's Brief, p. 14.) However, that statement is 
i 
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unsupported by any information or evidence contained in the 
record. Since it is obvious that the tow truck driver arrived 
a considerable time after the assault had occurred, trial 
counsel may have determined that the driver had little 
relevant evidence to add to Young's case. 
The evidence regarding the testimony of Bobbi Johnson 
indicates that she was subpoenaed to trial and she was 
interviewed prior to trial by trial counsel. Unfortunately 
for Young, Johnson's testimony fell apart under cross-
examination. There is simply no indication from the record 
that Johnson's testimony would have been different or more 
coherent had she spent more time being interviewed by trial 
counsel. Also, Johnson did not observe the assault on Officer 
Lozano. Her testimony was that she started watching after 
Young had been pepper sprayed. (Trial Transcript, pages 112, 
117.) 
Young relies on the case of State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 
182 (Utah 1990), for the proposition that Young's trial 
counsel failed to adequately investigate the witnesses. This 
reliance is misplaced. In Templin, the court found that the 
defendant's counsel had not spoken with or subpoenaed several 
key witnesses. That is not the case here. In this case, 
15 
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Young's trial counsel subpoenaed both Bobbi Johnson and EMT 
Glezos. (Record, pages 38-41.) Johnson testified at trial and 
EMT Glezos was excused after being interviewed by trial 
counsel, clearly a strategic decision. The only mystery is the 
tow truck driver, and the record contains no evidence as to 
any discussions trial counsel may have had with the tow truck 
driver or whether or not he was subpoenaed to trial. Unlike 
the counsel in Templin, Young's trial counsel subpoenaed and 
interviewed the appropriate witnesses. 
Young's second assertion of ineffective assistance of 
counsel relates to the allegation that trial counsel failed to 
investigate the effects of pepper spray thereby depriving 
Young of an alternative explanation for her resistance to 
being handcuffed. This allegation is simply not supported by 
the record. 
There was evidence presented through both the direct 
testimony and cross-examination of Officer Kishiyama regarding 
the effect of pepper spray. ("Trial Transcript, pages 57-59.) 
Also, Young testified about the effect of the pepper spray on 
her. (Trial Transcript, pages 141-142.) Trial counsel argued 
the exact issue now being raised as an omission on appeal 
16 
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during both his opening and closing arguments. During opening 
argument he stated: 
"My client did struggle at that point because of 
the affect of the mace. In fact, she'll testify, 
she has no clear recollection of anything that 
happened since the time she was maced in the face 
because of the pain that she was in from the 
chemical burning until she was on the grass with 
another police officer standing over her at some 
point later. She doesn't know what happened in 
between." ("Trial Transcript, page 48.) 
During closing argument, trial counsel stated: 
"At that point, things escalate one step 
further. My client says that while they were bent 
over, the officer reached around and, blam, nailed 
her with the pepper spray, the OC spray. Got it in 
her eyes and her mouth and everything. It was a 
heavy dose. And, frankly, she doesn't remember a 
whole lot after that. She was nauseated, she was 
sick, she was blinded, she had mucus running all 
over her face, tears coming out of her eyes. And 
that is what the officer said happens when you 
pepper spray somebody." (Trial Transcript, page 
200. ) 
Also during closing argument defense counsel stated: 
"There's two very real alternatives about what 
happened here. And under the second alternative of 
what happened, did she assault a peace officer? Did 
she make an attempt with unlawful force or violence 
to do bodily injury to another? Or was she reacting 
after being pepper sprayed in the face and flailing 
around because of the burns and pain, the 
excruciating pain, she was feeling in her face? Is 
that what was going on?" (Trial Transcript, page 
206. ) 
17 
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Trial counsel also stated "and my client froze up and 
grabbed the keys. That's not an assault. And everything else 
occurred after she got pepper sprayed". (Trial Transcript 
page 207.) Any additional evidence regarding the effects of 
pepper spray would have merely added to the similar evidence 
already before the jury. 
Young's third allegation of error is that her trial 
counsel failed to put on evidence concerning the charge of 
violation of a protective order that had been filed by Officer 
Lozano and then dismissed prior to trial. According to her 
argument, informing the jury of the filing of this charge 
which was later dismissed may have raised questions in the 
minds of the jurors regarding Lozano's mind set at the time of 
arrest. 
The record is devoid of any evidence regarding trial 
counsel's investigation or involvement in the dismissal of 
this charge. However, there is an obvious strategic reason 
for not raising this issue before the jury. According to the 
evidence proffered by Young's appellate counsel at the motion 
for a new trial, he indicates that the protective order was 
issued as a result of a physical altercation with her ex-
husband which he described as "this little so called slapping 
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incident, which there was a little slapping, for vulgar 
language, on the mouth, not very hard or forceful, but there 
was a little slap". (Motion Transcript, page 27.) This 
information obviously would have come to light and, although 
the protective order was later dismissed, it is clear that a 
protective order had been issued by the District Court. Trial 
counsel was left with the decision to weigh the benefit of 
showing a potential bias by Lozano, against the potential harm 
of admitting that his client had been involved in a previous 
physical altercation that had resulted in the issuance of a 
court order against her. Such a decision clearly falls within 
the realm of trial strategy and should not be questioned on 
review. This is particularly true given the extremely slight 
evidentiary value of this evidence. Since the charges were 
filed after the incident, it is only evidence of Lozano's mind 
set after she had been assaulted by Young, not before. 
The final error asserted by Young is that her trial 
counsel's failure to plead to the Expired Registration charge 
prior to trial painted her in an unfavorable light before the 
jury. Once again, there is an obvious strategic reason for 
trial counsel's action. It is entirely plausible that it was 
trial counsel's intention to allow the jury the option of 
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convicting Young on the lesser charge of Expired Registration 
while finding her not guilty of Assault on a Police Officer. 
With both charges available to them, the jury had the option 
of reaching a verdict in essentially what would be the "middle 
ground". By pleading to the Expired Registration charge prior 
to trial, Young would be forcing the jury into an all or 
nothing decision. This trial strategy makes perfect sense 
when one considers that all of the evidence regarding Expired 
Registration would most likely been presented at trial anyway, 
since the City would have had to provide a basis for the 
traffic stop and explained the events leading up to the 
assault by Young. 
Young's argument that she may have appeared to the jury 
to be unreasonably fighting all • of the charges is also in 
conflict with her testimony at trial. At trial she did not 
dispute the registration charge but instead readily admitted 
that she had committed a violation. (Trial Transcript, pages 
148-149. ) 
B. THE JURY'S VERDICT IS STRONGLY SUPPORTED AND 
ANY ALLEGED ERRORS BY YOUNG'S TRIAL COUNSEL DID 
NOT AFFECT THE OUTCOME OF THE TRIAL. 
If, for the sake of argument, the actions of Young's 
trial counsel are considered to have fallen below a reasonable 
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level of competence, Young can still not satisfy the second 
prong of the Strickland test. In order to meet the 
requirements of the second prong of the Strickland test, Young 
must show "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 694. In 
determining whether or not this standard has been met, the 
Utah Court of Appeals has stated: 
NXIn deciding whether a case should be remanded for 
retrial on the basis of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, 'an appellate court should consider the 
totality of the evidence, taking into account such 
factors as whether the errors effect the entire 
evidentiary picture or have an isolated effect and 
how strongly the verdict is supported by the 
record.'" 
State v. Strain, 885 P. 2d 810 (Utah App. 1994) (quoting 
Templin, 805 P. 2d at 187.) 
In this case, the verdict is strongly supported by the 
evidence presented at trial. Even taken in their best light, 
as errors, rather than strategic decisions, the actions of 
Young's trial counsel related only to minor evidentiary issues 
and did not attack the strength of the City's case. 
At the core of the City' s case is the testimony of 
Lozano regarding Young's assault. Lozano testified that 
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Young's first action constituting an assault was a kick to 
Lozano's chest. (Trial Transcript, pages 87,90.) This 
testimony is not effected by any of the perceived errors now 
being alleged by Young. Lozano also testified that her 
fingers were injured by Young digging her fingernails into 
Lozano during the struggle for the car keys. (Trial 
Transcript, pages 88-90.) 
Young now argues that her trial counsel was deficient in 
not presenting a medical expert to testify regarding the 
nature of the injuries to her hand. However, the testimony of 
this medical expert would have been of little benefit to 
Young, he expert's information contained in Young's affidavit 
confirms that Lozano did indeed suffer an injury to her 
fingers. This directly contradicts the testimony, of Young 
that V\I do not recall grabbing Miss-- Officer Lozano's hands". 
(Trial Transcript, page 156.) The fact that an injury 
occurred is also supported in the evidence by the testimony of 
both Officer Kishiyama and Officer Moore who testified they 
observed the injury to Lozano's hand when they arrived on the 
scene. (Trial Transcript, pages 55,72.) Finally, Young's \ 
other potential witness, EMT Glezos, would have presumably 
further buttressed the prosecution's position by testifying 
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that he had observed the injuries to Lozano, advised her how 
to care for the injury, and provided her with a bandaid. 
(Trial Transcript, page 96; Record, pages 110-114; Hearing 
Transcript, page 12). 
Young's arguments regarding the failure to call EMT 
Glezos, the tow truck driver, and adequately interview Bobbi 
Johnson, all reflect instances which, even if they are to be 
considered to be errors, did not effect the outcome of the 
trial. For example, the proffered testimony of EMT Glezos 
would have at most produced two additional pieces of 
testimony. Glezos presumably would have testified that he 
observed no blood on Young and that Young was kneeling on the 
ground, in handcuffs, when he arrived. Neither of these 
pieces of evidence strike at the core of the City's case, nor 
do they add any evidence that was not already produced at 
trial. Bobbi Johnson testified that she observed Young lying 
face down on the ground (Trial Transcript, pages 109,119.), 
Young testified that she was kneeling (Trial Transcript, page 
142.), and the officers testified that she was sitting (Trial 
Transcript, pages 55,71,93.). This issue, which is certainly 
not central to the crime committed, was already in dispute 
before the jury. 
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Similarly, there was already Testimony from a City 
witness, Officer Moore, that he did not observe any blood on 
Young (Trial Transcript, page 72.). It's not surprising that 
some people at the scene did not see the relatively small 
amount of blood on Young, which Officer Lozano described as "a 
couple of dots'' (Trial Transcript, page 96.). Glezos' 
testimony would not have produced evidence other than that 
already produced at trial. When the defendant has failed to 
demonstrate how further investigation by council would have 
produced evidence other than that already presented at trial, 
the defendant has failed to demonstrate how the additional 
investigation would have provided the defendant with 
sufficient information to alter the outcome of the trial. 
State v. Baker, 963 P. 2d 801(Utah App. 1998). 
The testimony of Bobbi Johnson and the tow truck driver 
were likewise not critical to the outcome of this trial. It 
is clear from her testimony that Bobbi Johnson did not see 
Young's assault on Officer Lozano. At best she saw certain 
portions of the aftermath. Since the description of the 
aftermath and the arrest have nothing to do with the offense, 
her testimony would not have affected the outcome of the 
trial. Similarly, the tow truck driver arrived on the scene 
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after the crime had occurred and any testimony that he or she 
may have provided would have been of little value. 
Young's argument regarding the failure to investigate and 
present the effect of pepper spray on the defendant also would 
not have produced evidence other than that already presented 
at trial. Officer Kishiyama, Officer Moore, and Young all 
testified as to the effects of pepper spray. Further, Young's 
trial counsel argued and described the effects of pepper spray 
in both his opening and closing argument. Much like the 
appellant in the Baker case, cited above, Young has failed to 
demonstrate how additional investigation of the effects of 
pepper spray would have produced evidence other than that 
already presented at trial and how that additional evidence 
would have effected the outcome of the trial. Baker, at 
P.808. 
Finally, Young alleges that her trial counsel's decision 
not to raise the protective order violation and decision to 
not plead to the Expired Registration charge were both errors 
by her trial counsel. In her brief however, she gives little 
explanation as to how these perceived failures would have 
caused the results of the trial to be different. At best, 
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each of these issues has the ability to cut both ways, both in 
favor of, and against Young's case. 
For example, informing the jury that the protective order 
violation had been erroneously charged by Officer Lozano would 
have resulted in the jury also being informed that Young had 
been involved in a physical altercation with her ex-husband, 
however minor that physical altercation may have been. 
Similarly, the failure to plead to the charge of driving on 
Expired Registration would have removed that charge from the 
jury's deliberations, however it woulo have also limited the 
possible outcomes of the trial. The potential for finding 
guilt on txhe Expired Registration and acquittal on the Assault 
on a Police Officer, clearly a result that would have been 
more beneficial to Young, would have been eliminated. Neither 
of these strategic decisions by Young's trial counsel have 
anything to do with the charge of Assault on a Police Officer, 
nor did they affect the outcome of this trial. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence relied upon by Young is not properly before 
this Court and should be disregarded. It consists of hearsay 
and new evidence contained in affidavits that were filed with 
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the trial court in support of a Motion for a New Trial. 
However, even if this information was admissible, it is still 
obvious that Young had competent legal counsel at trial and 
that her trial was fair. 
All of the errors alleged by Young can be explained as 
obvious strategic decisions made by her trial counsel. Her 
trial counsel actively and aggressively defended Young at 
trial. He fully participated in jury selection. He 
subpoenaed the appropriate witnesses, although he chose not to 
use certain witnesses. He aggressively cross-examined the 
City's witnesses. He offered appropriate objections both 
during the trial and following closing argument. And, he 
passionately pleaded the facts of the case in both his opening 
and closing arguments. Young's trial counsel's performance 
did not fall below a reasonable level of competence in this 
case . 
A review of the record also reveals that Young was not 
prejudiced by the actions of her trial counsel. Even if all 
of the evidence she perceives as being critical had been 
admitted at trial, the outcome of the trial would not have 
changed. The clear focus of the purported additional evidence 
is on the arrest and it's aftermath. With the exception of 
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the evidence of the medical expert, none of this additional 
evidence has anything to do with the crimes she committed. 
With respect to the medical expert, at best his testimony 
would have disputed the extent of the injury to Lozano, not 
that an injury did or did not occur. The fact that Lozano 
suffered an injury was supported by substantial evidence at 
trial. None of the issues raised by Ycung would have effected 
the outcome of the trial below. 
Young has failed to satisfy either prong of the 
Strickland test for ineffective assistance of counsel. She 
was more than adequately represented by counsel, her trial was 
fair, and the results of that trial should be affirmed by this 
court. 
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